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A POINT OF VIEW 
A Business Strategy for Shipbuilders 
By WAYNE HUGHES 
A 
shipbuilder friend who wish­
es to develop a better business 
strategy gave me a set of questions 
to answer, most of which were 




it is not possible to know future 
strategies, operations and technolo- �gies. Nor is it necessary. It is suffi- �





past to see in what ways the U.S. Navy has failed to stay 
current in the present. 
Because the Navy builds big, multipurpose ships 
designed for 40-year combat service lives, we must 
employ the same fleet for every future, whether 
American policy and strategy at a given moment in a 
specific location is to cooperate, compete, confront or 
fight some enemy at some level of conflict. We can't 
change a fleet's composition when the strategy changes 
if the fleet comprises mostly large warships that take 
years to fund, design, build and train for their many 
missions and tasks. 
Ships with 40-year service lives also are expensive to 
modify or replace. The Navy is going to modularize our 
next generation of expensive, multipurpose ships. That is 
a good thing to do, but a numerically large part of the fleet 
should include small, single-purpose warships with easy­
to-train-to missions. When these less-expensive littoral 
ships and their small, easily trained crews are overtaken 
by new technologies or geopolitical changes, they can be 
discarded or transferred to friendly nations and replaced 
affordably with the new technology and tactics. Such sim­
ple, single-purpose combatants can be programmed not 
for 40 years, but for short, 15-year combat lives. 
I could make a long list of warning signals from the 
past. One example suffices: the August 1994 issue of 
the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings in just four arti­
cles accurately anticipated the need to change the 
Navy's composition: 
■ "China's Navy Stirs" by LT Michael Forsythe: "China's
economic growth will produce a first-class navy - to
ignore this is 'strategic procrastination."'
■ 'The Next U.S. Warship Design" by Reuven Leopold:
"The Arleigh Burkes are not the be-all-and-end-all -
new missions and new systems call for new platforms."
■ "Combatant Craft Have a Role in Littoral Warfare"
by retired RADM George Worthington.
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■ "A New Measure of Naval Forces" by Norman
Polmar: "Frigates have become the major warships of 
many of the world's navies. At the same time, the U.S. 
Navy is disposing of virtually all frigates." 
These astute observations are 20 years old and there 
are many more like them. 
Trends Over 30 Years 
A shipbuilder today doesn't need to predict the future 
to anticipate Navy needs. Contractors who have pre­
liminary designs of the right ships, aircraft and sup­
porting systems will have an advantage when the Navy 
wakes up to the following five prominent changes. 
Trends over the past 30 years that should have 
affected our fleet composition: 
1. The foremost operational change has been that the
seas are no longer a safe sanctuary for U.S. fleet opera­
tions. In many littoral waters, we cannot project power
without risk of enemy attack. The threat of loss will
keep multibillion-dollar surface ships from entering
dangerous waters because it is a fleet that must not lose
an aircraft carrier ( CVN), an amphibious assault ship
(LHA) or even a guided-missile destroyer (DDG). Apart
from the extreme embarrassment of it, the Navy is going
to have no ships to spare for operations in safer waters.
2. The foremost national security change is the nation's
present financial predicament. Yet the Navy heedlessly
persists with a program that will cost $4 billion to $8
billion more per year than the average Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy, budget over the past two de­
cades. The serious budget deficit and national debt are
the only trends that did not emerge until about five
years ago, but they will curtail defense spending for
many years to come.
3. The foremost national strategy change resulted from
the rise of Chinese maritime interests, her growing
fleet and (not to be overlooked) her vulnerabilities at
sea and the opportunity for a U.S. sea denial strategy in
the China Seas. A corollary is the need to plan for and
practice cooperative operations with our allies and
friends in East and South Asia.
4. The foremost technology change was the "Revolution
in Military Affairs," with its precision missiles, modern
cyber systems, satellites with many capabilities, long­
range scouting, accurate targeting and so on. At least 40
years ago, most navies began the shift from the aircraft
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"We can't change a fleet's composition when the strategy changes if the 
fleet comprises mostly large warships that take years to fund, design, build 
and train for their many missions and tasks." 
era to the missile era of warfare, yet the U.S. Navy con­
tinues to act as if aircraft carriers and carrier battle 
groups are the centerpiece of naval combat power. 
5. The foremost impending technology change now
under way is large numbers of small, versatile, inex­
pensive, unmanned and increasingly autonomous
vehicles for air, surface and subsurface operations. In
response, the Navy is pursuing an unmanned vehicle
capability aggressively, but we have not put equal
emphasis on preparing for enemy potentialities.
Fleet changes that should have been initiated 
because of the five prominent trends: 
■ Design affordability changes into next-generation
nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), accom­
panied by a new operational perspective, i.e., patrols in
bays, inlets and safer, protectable waters, in order to
relax expensive test depth and quietness standards.
■ Build either less-expensive or fewer theater ballistic
missile (TBM) defense ships than are now planned.
■ Build fewer CVN/carrier air wings because they are
unaffordable, vulnerable and undistributable. A better
naval air capability is a mix of big and smaller carriers,
supplemented by unmanned air vehicles and accompa­
nied by standoff missile power in surface ships and
submarines. It is a force that welcomes Air Force strike
aircraft whenever they are cost-competitive.
■ Build new and affordable blue-water frigates to grad­
ually replace Aegis ships, which are becoming obsolete
against improved anti-ship cruise missiles and TBMs.
New methods of defense are plausible, if we add elec­
tronic smoke screens, laser weapons and well-practiced
command, control and computers to the traditional
fast-acting, short-range, soft-kill systems that, unlike
hard-kill weapons, have been highly effective in the
past. Necessity is the mother of invention.
■ Put more emphasis on undersea warfare capability for
offensive operations and sea denial. Since sustaining the
present fast-attack submarine (SSN) force level will be
essential but costly; new methods should include offensive
mines, autonomous underwater vessels and small, inex­
pensive, shallow-water, air-independent propulsion diesel
submarines to supplement first line SSNs. More yet, we
should develop and practice collaborative offensive sub­
marine operations with our allies, especially in East Asia.
■ Build a new, more affordable and more distributable
amphibious lift with a smaller total capacity, pointing 
out to the Marine Corps that we can't afford to fulfill 
all their requirements; no ground operation is possible 
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without a blue-water fleet sufficient to support and 
sustain the operation; the new, less-costly lift comports 
with the Marines' intention to develop combat capabil­
ities in distributable company-size building blocks; 
speed of delivery is often as important as the size of the 
force delivered; naval forces have not conducted an 
opposed amphibious assault since Inchon in 1950; and 
the Navy's amphibious lift must also deliver and sup­
port Army and Special Forces. 
None of the above ships is suitable for fighting on 
the surface in littoral waters, or for conducting cooper­
ative exercises with allies and partners. Only a flotilla 
of littoral combatants can maintain a sustained or 
rotating presence in critical cul-de-sacs that are vari­
able in geography, logistically diverse and entail differ­
ent friendly and enemy air operations. By cul-de-sac, I 
mean the Yellow Sea, the three China Seas, the Sea of 
Japan, the Persian Gulf, the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Aegean Seas, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. 
What Should Be Done? 
The most compelling U.S. Navy need is to split the 
replacements for the littoral combats ship (LCS) into a 
blue-water frigate and a green-water combatant. A 
shipbuilder's business plan should include a variety of 
smaller, simpler combatant designs. The green-water 
combatants can be designed with the certain knowl­
edge that they will be the first surface warships put at 
risk if and when the U.S. Navy must fight in littoral 
waters. Working examples are Chinese Type 022 
Houbeis, Swedish Visbys, several generations of Israeli 
Sa'ars and many mine countermeasures ship designs. 
The second-generation replacements for LCS must 
not take a decade to design and deploy. As the real 
Horatio Nelson and his fictitious disciple Jack Aubrey 
said, there is not a moment to lose. The sooner ship­
builders are able to deliver a squadron of such ships, 
the sooner our Navy can develop new and much differ­
ent offensive tactics for stealthy, lethal sea-denial oper­
ations in enemy waters. ■
Wayne Hughes is a professor in the Department of Operations 
Research at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif. 
"A Point of View" is a Sea power f arum wherein experts and 
analysts express their views on q variety of thought-provoking 
topics. The views expressed here are the author's and not neces­
sarily those of the Navy League of the United States. 
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